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Abstract— In its current form, RFID system are susceptible to a 
range of malevolent attacks. With the rich business intelligence 
that RFID infrastructure could possibly carry, security is of 
paramount importance. In this paper, we formalise various 
threat models due tag cloning on the RFID system. We also 
present a simple but efficient and cost effect technique that 
strengthens the resistance of RFID tags to cloning attacks. Our 
techniques can even strengthen tags against cloning in 
environments with untrusted reading devices.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is an emerging 
technology for electronic labeling of objects for the purpose of 
automatically identifying, categorizing, locating and tracking 
the objects. With several high-profile adoptions (e.g., Wal-
mart) and the legislative mandates for usage of RFID 
technology as anti-counterfeiting technology for at-risk 
pharmaceuticals in the USA [10], RFID technology has gained 
significant momentum in the past few years. As a result, RFID 
has emerged as practical automatic identification system in 
industries as varied as high-way tolling, baggage handling, 
leading clothing manufacturers and shipping companies and 
cattle herding [8, 9].
With respect to the exiting identification systems such as 
optical barcodes, RFID technology provides numerous 
advantages that include non-line-of-sight operation, rapid 
identification speed and high identification rates. For example, 
in the supply chain management, RFID ensures traceability of 
goods from manufacturing through sale and even beyond it.
These capabilities make RFID ideal to be used in many 
application domains ranging from military to public and 
commercial applications. Passive, small and inexpensive RFID 
tags fulfill the needs of current supply chain applications and 
are likely to serve as a future replacement of the barcodes. 
Nonetheless, there are some significant challenges that 
must be overcome before RFID benefits are fully realized. In 
particular, despite of its enormous potentials, RFID technology
poses serious security and privacy threats both to individuals 
and organizations [1, 5, 8]. Security issues have become a 
barrier to the widespread adoption of RFID technology and 
with the rich business intelligence that RFID infrastructure 
could possibly carry, security is of paramount importance.
However, the whole RFID system security relies on the 
premise that an RFID tag is harder to copy than a bar code. For 
example, a passive attacker might be able to overhear the 
information between a reader and some tags because the 
medium is the air in the RFID system. An active attacker may 
be able to send some bogus data that fakes the reader or tags to 
extract information from them. 
A primary security concern surrounding RFID technology 
and the focus of this paper is the problem of tag cloning [5, 8, 
9].  Current research in RFID is focused on privacy enhancing 
technologies through access control mechanisms while security 
vulnerabilities such as RFID tag cloning has received 
somewhat less attention [3, 5, 8]. For example, Chris Paget has 
demonstrated how one can use inexpensive off-the-shelf 
components to clone large numbers of the unique electronic 
identifiers used in US passport cards and next generation 
drivers licenses [9]. In all these applications cloning and 
impersonation of RFID tags could be financially lucrative for 
occasional hackers or professional criminals, and severely 
damaging for the licit companies' revenues and reputation [5]. 
Therefore, as tag cloning is one of the serious security 
problems facing RFID infrastructure, techniques for 
strengthening RFID systems against tag cloning attacks is of 
paramount importance. 
We propose a simple but effective new technique to tackle 
the passive RFID-tag cloning problem. The proposed approach 
is extremely efficient lightweight tag authentication protocol 
and offers an adequate security level for certain applications 
and can be implemented even in the most limited low-cost 
RFID tags. In addition, the proposed scheme is compliant with 
the EPC Class-1 Generation-2 UHF-RFID standard which is 
the major RFID standards body known as EPCglobal has 
recently ratified [2]. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, 
the background to the RFID is presented. The system model, 
threat models and related work are discussed. The proposed tag 
cloning resistance algorithm and the security analysis of the 
proposed algorithm are discussed in Section 3 and Section 4 
respectively. The conclusion and future direction is discussed 
in Section 5.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we specify the security properties that we 
want our protocol to achieve. We begin by describing the 
system model as well as the assumptions regarding the readers 
and tags being used. We then discuss various threat models due 
tag cloning on the RFID system. 
A. System Model
As shown in Fig. 1, a typical deployment of an RFID 
system involves three types of entities: tags, readers and back-
end servers. An RFID reader can be a PDA, a mobile phone or 
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any kind of devices capable of querying object identity stored 
in a RFID tag.
The tags are attached to, or embedded in, objects to be
identified. Each tag in the system has a unique identifier. RFID 
tags can store basic information (e.g., an address) as well as 
more complex information as well as more complex 
information such as a the repair and service history of an 
aircraft part [18]. In general, RFID tags are classified based on 
their power supply source, as passive, semi-passive, and active. 
Passive tags have no internal power source while semi-passive 
and active tags have on-board power source. Cost wise, passive 
tags are the cheapest and expected to soon be comparable to 
that of barcodes. This makes passive tags quite attractive to 
businesses. An example of passive tags is an EPC (Electronic 
Product Code) tag [2]. As low-cost RFID tags are expected to 
be in wide use, we will specifically focus on them in this paper.
Reader
Tag
Backend
Server
Secured Wired Channel
Insecure RF 
Channel
Fig. 1: An RFID system architecture
The tags and the reader communicate using a radio 
frequency link, while the reader is connected to the back-end 
server through a secure wired link. Note that securing the 
communication link between the readers and the back-end 
database could be trivially accomplished by protocols such as 
SSL. The back-end servers are trusted entities that maintain an
enterprise database containing the information needed to 
identify tags, including their identification numbers. It is 
assumed that the servers are physically secure and not 
attackable. The enterprise database hosted on the backend 
server is secured by authentication and authorization tools and 
could only be accessed by a reader after full authentication.
Due to the RFID industry’s desire to trade-off hardware 
functionality in order to manufacture passive tags that cost less 
than 5¢, security has received somewhat less attention. This has 
resulted in various vulnerabilities that can be easily exploited to 
compromise RFID-enabled system infrastructures. In the 
following subsection, we will focus on threats due to tag 
cloning attacks.
B. Threat Model
RFID systems are susceptible to a broad array of 
malevolent attacks ranging from passive eavesdropping to 
active interference. RFID has the vulnerabilities of any wireless 
system, where passive and active attacks can be performed 
easily. Also, the limitations on cost, size and power 
consumption for low cost passive tags result in low security 
features. The whole security relies on the premise that an RFID 
tag is harder to copy than a bar code. However, passive tags are 
easily forgeable and creating a fake (i.e., clone) tags from an 
original tag is already a simple exercise. 
To cloning a tag, the tag id is essentially all the attackers 
need. Juels [1] shows that EPC tags are vulnerable to 
elementary cloning and counterfeiting attacks yet RFID tag 
cloning has received somewhat less attention [3]. Tag cloning 
attacks is exacerbated by the fact that the tags can be 
manipulated by rogue readers. As an RFID readers are easily 
available and even being included in mobile phones [16], 
tracking a tag bearer is quite possible today. Hence it is 
possible for an adversary to read the RFID tag and correlate its 
time and place to learn more about the tag. Therefore, it is quite 
clear that new countermeasure approaches need to be 
developed to thwart the potential threats RFID systems face. 
There are several issues that facilitate the tag cloning
attack, including eavesdropping threat and skimming threat. 
Once tag identification is captured, an attacker can duplicate 
genuine tags and use the cloned tag for a variety of malicious 
purposes. For example, it can be used for counterfeiting where
an attacker can replace tags for expensive items with tags for 
cheaper ones. It can also be used as a warmware. It doesn't 
take much malicious code to do things like an SQL injection 
in RFID, which will create a chain reaction of corrupted data 
that flows into the central information resource. As 
demonstrated in [6], a good RFID tag could be replaced with a 
virus coded tag that could do its dastardly deeds in RFID 
system. RFID tag cloning in turn could lead to other attacks 
such as denial-of-service (DoS) attack. DoS occur when an 
RFID system cannot function properly to provide normal 
services to valid users; it is a common threat to Internet server 
systems. 
One major problem with RFID infrastructure is that there is 
no mechanism to distinguish between real and counterfeit 
components in the system. Specifically, it is impossible for an 
RFID reader to distinguish an authentic tag from a cloned one.
The main security problem that we address in this paper can be 
stated as follows: How can a reader tell that a certain RFID tag 
is really the one that it intended to talk to? Specifically, the 
question is how to prevent the cloned tags from impersonating 
legitimate tags. Tag cloning attacks is exacerbated by the fact 
that the tags can be manipulated by rogue readers. As an RFID 
readers are easily available and even being included in mobile 
phones [16], tracking a tag bearer is quite possible today. 
Hence it is possible for an adversary to read the RFID tag and 
correlate its time and place to learn more about the tag. 
Therefore, it is quite clear that new countermeasure approaches 
need to be developed to thwart the potential threats RFID 
systems face. 
C. Related Work
Given low-cast RFID tags expected wide-spread use in 
various applications, cost effective techniques to strengthen 
passive tags against tag cloning attack is paramount. 
Strengthening passive tags against cloning requires making the 
RFID system resistant to several attacks including skimming 
attacks, eavesdropping and active attacks. 
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A natural solution to the security vulnerability stated 
before is to employ cryptographic protocol in RFID 
system. To this end, several implicit tag authentication 
algorithms have been discussed in the literature [1, 4, 5]. 
In hash-lock protocol [5] and its variants, tags are 
expected to respond to readers query by generating a 
hashed value of its identifier. The reader will then use the 
back-end server to authenticate the tag. In addition to the 
fact that hash function implementation is still beyond 
current capability of low-cost RFID tag, this approach has 
many problems including synchronization problem, 
scalability problem, spoofing and eavesdrop attacks.
The typical EPCglobal EPC Class-1 Gen-2 standard 
authentication mechanism is fallible as it was shown that 
after simple computations an attacker can acquire the 
access and kill passwords with high probability [11]. Juels 
[1] proposal for solving cloning attack is vulnerable to 
eavesdropping and active attacks, etc. Karthikeyan and 
Nesterenko [12] proposed a tag identification and reader 
authentication protocol based on simple XOR and matrix 
operation. This approach could end up updating the key 
wrongly leading to the situation where the legitimate 
reader and the tag will not be able to authenticate each 
other anymore. Moreover, the protocol is also vulnerable 
to replay attacks and privacy location is not guaranteed.
In the minimalist cryptography approach [4], a tag 
stores a set of pre-prepared pseudonyms. When a tag is 
queried by a reader, it responds with the next metaID in 
the list. The main flaw of this scheme is that an attacker 
can send a few queries to obtain all the metaIDs on a tag 
and use these metaIDs to track this tag until the tag meets 
a legitimate reader again. The solution proposed in [1] to 
modify EPC Class-1 Generation-2 tags, to test the validity 
of the kill PIN, is operable only with EPC tags. The 
solution does not protect against eavesdropping and 
cloning of a tag. Also the solution is only temporary.
Passive RFID tags are designed to offer battery-free 
operation and low cost. Thus, they have extremely 
limited capabilities often being able to hold–and in fewer 
cases protect–only a simple entity identifier and 
potentially a very limited amount of information. Also, 
the logic gates of the current passive tags are about 500–
5000 and thus RFID tags require lightweight encryption 
and security protocols. This limitation coupled with 
limited computing resources and cost, existing encryption 
and security protocols are not practical for use on limited 
resource tags. Therefore, an authentication protocol must 
be designed taking into consideration the limited 
computing capacity and low storage space of low price 
tags. Therefore, none of the existing proposals are an ideal 
solution to the problem we stated. Also, given the current
and expected low-cost RFID tag capabilities, most of the 
existing proposals could not be practical as they assume 
beyond the capabilities of passive tags.
Our scheme is based on partial information sharing 
between the entities in the system. The proposed protocol 
protects against tag cloning by protecting the identity of 
tags. Additionally, our protocol is very simple and it can 
be implemented easily with the use of standard 
cryptographic hash functions.
III. TAG CLONING RESISTANCE ALGORITHM
In this section, we discuss the proposed tag cloning 
resistance protocol. Before describing our protocol in detail, 
we give the definitions of notations that we use in the 
description of our protocol. We assume that there are Y 
readers in the system:  YR,,RR ...1 (1)
Also, we assume that there are X passive tags in the system: XT,,TT ...1 (2)
Each tag TTi  has an electronic product code  EPCT . As 
passive tags are resource limited devices that only have less 
than 1K logical gates for security functions, we assume that a 
tag is able to perform rudimentary functions such as string 
comparison, bitwise XOR   and pseudo-random number 
generation (PRNG), 
^ ` ^ `lf 1,01,0: * o (3)
These assumptions are justified by current features 
implemented in many RFIDs tags [2]. For a PRNG that 
generates a 16-bit pseudo-random number, it is shown that, 
among a number of 10,000 tags, the chance that any two tags 
simultaneously generate the same 16-bit pseudo-random 
number is less than 0.1% and the probability of that guessing 
the next pseudo-random number generated by a tag is less than 
0:025% under the assumption that all previous outputs are 
known to an attacker [2].
We assume that the readers and the server are able to 
perform, in addition to those operations performed by the tag, 
standard cryptographic protocols and one-way hash function 
operation given as follows:
^ ` ^ `lh 1,01,0: * o (4)
The RFID reader and the server will run the same hash 
function and the same random number generator with the 
same seed S. 
The proposed algorithm has two main phases: registration 
phase and communication phase, each of which is described 
below.
A. Pre-deployment phase
Tags and readers must register with the database server 
separately before deployment. We assume that the registration 
process is performed under a secure environment. 
Database server
The server generates and maintains in its database over all 
known tags the following list of tuple: iIDEPCVID KR,T,TD ,m (5)
where
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x EPCT and VIDT denote the actual an virtual unique 
identifiers of tag TTi  respectively;
x IDR and VIDR denote the actual and virtual unique 
identifiers of reader RRi  ; and
x iK denotes the currently valid key for tag TTi  and 
RRi  .
We assume that the backend server is highly trustful. The 
key iK is generated uniformly at random, and held as a shared 
secret between the tag and the server. Also, we assume that 
during the manufacturing time, the manufacturer setup a tag by 
assigning EPCT and other parameters. Similarly, the reader will 
have a unique identifier assigned by the manufacturer. Note 
that both of these values could also be done by the server prior 
to the tag and reader deployment. 
ButtonSi,RID, RVID, Ki
ButtonTVID, TEPC, Ki
……………..
…………….
TVID, TAID, RID, Ki
…………….
…………….TEPC
DatabaseTag
Reader
RVID,Si, Ki
RID
TVID, Ki
Fig. 2: Pre-deployment registration
Fig 2 shows the steps undertaken at pre-deployment 
registration point. Upon registration, both the tag and the reader 
get a set of core parameters needed to distinguish a family from 
non-family system component from the server and these 
parameters are then stored in the database.
Reader Registration 
Each reader RRi  will maintain the following tuple: iVIDIDii KRRSR ,,,m      (8)
Upon registration with the server, the reader will receive the 
following tuple from the server:
       iVIDii KR,SR ,m                      (9)
where VIDR is the virtual unique identifier of the reader and it 
is computed as follows:     iRIDLIDVID SRDhR m      (10)
where  LIDD is the left half of the  database id and  RIDR is 
the right half of a registered reader id. It is assumed that 
both  LIDD and  RIDR are two large numbers and unique in 
the system. For example, let us say   1010 LIDD and   .0100 RIDR Then,  .10100100hTVID m
The parameter iS is the current session nonce, which is 
renewed each time the server and the reader communicate and 
generated as follows:
          ii SfS m1                       (10)
Tag Registration 
Each tag TTi  will maintain the following tuple: iEPCVIDi KT,TR ,m      (10)
At registration point, the server assigns each tag the following 
tuple:
        iVIDi K,TT m                    (11)
The parameter VIDT denotes the tag virtual id, which is 
computed as follows:     RIDLIDVID RDhT m    (7)
where  LIDD is the left half of the  database id and  RIDR is 
the right half of a registered reader id.. 
B. Tag Authentication Algorithm
Fig. 3 shows the basic steps interactions between the RFID 
system components after deployment. The two principal parties 
involved in this protocol are readers and tags. Due to the fact 
that the tags used are passive, the communication must be 
initiated by the readers.
Algorithm TagAuth
Begin
1.     SfTTT:T vLaim
2. iR:TTo
3.   ^RRR: kRk  d
a.    RkLais RTTK .m
b.   vis TTKhC .  m
c.   breakTrueCif   
`
4. Return C
End TagAuth
Fig. 3: Tag authentication algorithm
How can a reader tell that a certain RFID tag is really the 
one that it intended to talk to? The answer to this question 
requires the existence of a tag authentication protocol that is 
capable of effectively preventing the tag cloning attack 
mentioned above. In this section, we discuss the proposed tag 
authentication protocol. 
We assume that there are x tags, ^ `xTTT ,...,1 and y 
readers, 
^ `yRRR ,...,1 in the system. Each tag TTi 
maintains a  iav K,T,T tuple where aT denotes the actual 
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unique identifier of tag TTi whereas vT denotes the tag 
virtual id and computed from the left half of aT and the right 
half of  RRi as follows:    RiLav RThT m     (1)
It is assumed that both  LaT and  RiR two large numbers 
and unique in the system. Similarly, the server maintains a list 
of  iiav KR,T,T , tuples in its database over all known tags. 
iK denotes the currently valid key for tag aT . We assume that 
iK is generated uniformly at random, and held as a shared 
secret between the tag and the server.
As tags are resource limited devices that only have less than 
1K logical gates for security functions, we assume that a tag is 
able to perform rudimentary functions such as string 
comparison, bitwise XOR   and random number generation 
(PRNG), ^ ` ^ `lf 1,01,0: * o . This is justified by current 
features implemented in many RFIDs tags [2]. 
In contrast, the readers and the server are able to perform, in 
addition to those performed by the tag, one-way hash function 
operation ^ ` ^ `lh 1,01,0: * o and standard cryptographic 
protocols. The reader and the server will run the same hash 
function and the same random number generator with the same 
seed S.
The proposed authentication protocol called TagAuth is 
presented in Fig. 3.  Following [1], BAo indicates a data 
flow from entity A to entity B, while A: indicates an operation 
performed locally by A. Due to the fact that most low-cost tags 
are passive, the communication must be initiated by readers. 
Thus, TagAuth is executed by a RFID reader R attempts to 
authenticate a tag T.
Specifically, when interrogated by a reader, a tag generates 
iT and sends it to the reader as follows (steps 1-2): 
    SfTTT vLai m (2)
In Eq. 2, the parameters  LaT and vT denote the left half bits 
of the tag identifier and the virtual id of the tag. The function  Sf generates fresh random number. 
When the reader receives iT , it goes into tag authentication 
process. The reader first creates a secrete key  sK from iT
and the reader identifier as follows:   RkLais RTTK .m (3)
where  Lai TT . is the left half bits of the tag id while  RiR is 
the right half bits of reader k. It then creates a hash of sK and 
compares it with vi TT . . If a match is found, the reader accepts 
the tag as authentic. Otherwise, it rejects it.
Our protocol is practical and useful for two reasons. First, it 
requires only an extremely small amount of computation; 
therefore, it has the capacity to be implemented within passive 
RFID tags, unlike the cryptography intense protocols in prior 
work. Second, our protocol deals with both privacy and 
authentication. This also decreases the overall cost production; 
but more importantly, it eliminates the need for any extra 
security devices.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Most RFID systems are inherently insecure. Our scheme is 
based on partial information share between the entities in the 
system. The proposed protocol enforces user privacy and 
protects against tag cloning. Additionally, our protocol is very 
simple and it can be implemented easily with the use of 
standard cryptographic hash functions.
It is obvious that our authentication scheme satisfies many 
of the security requirements we mentioned in the introduction, 
in particular protection against tracing and tag cloning. Since 
the tag response changes in a secure manner after every read 
query then attempts like eavesdropping, spoofing, replaying 
messages, etc. cannot compromise the security of the scheme. 
Thus, our scheme does not suffer from the obvious security 
disadvantage of tag traceability. 
A tag that does not carry a valid identifier will not achieve 
successful authentication in this protocol. Thus an adversary 
cannot successfully clone a tag without knowledge of a valid 
aT obtained, for example, via skimming. However, the tag 
never sends its identifier thus, it is quite difficult to clone a tag. 
Listening to messages exchanged in a particular session 
reveals no information. Furthermore, with every session a new 
nonce is generated guaranteeing the freshness of messages. 
Therefore, if the tag which changes its response at every 
session using a random nonce opens a new session for a fake 
request message, the ongoing legal authentication session will 
fail by this illegal authentication trial. 
Furthermore, since a tag response is randomized in every 
session, our scheme prevents an adversary from performing a 
spoofing attack. The protocol makes it hard to mount a replay 
attack as the tag generates a fresh random number r in its 
response. It is relatively hard for replay attacks when fresh 
random values are generated and used during each new 
authentication process. 
V. CONCLUSIONS
RFID technology presents a number of advantages, but also 
opens a huge number of security problems that need to be 
addressed before its successful deployment. In this paper, we 
have designed a tag authentication protocol and shown that the 
proposed protocol do handle the identified threats (i.e., tag 
cloning). Since RFID tag has only small computing power, our 
approach to move tag’s computation to the reader and database 
server is reasonable. Also, the proposed authentication 
algorithm does not have any database synchronization problem, 
which makes it ideal for implementation on low-cost RFID 
tags. We discussed security aspects of our scheme and 
compared its efficiency with previous ones in terms of the time 
and the space complexity with the communication cost 
involved in identifying one single tag.
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